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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
STATEMENT OF AMENITY, INC.
CAPITAL GENERAL CORPORATION,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
PETITION FOR WRIT OF
UTAH SECURITIES DIVISION
AND THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUSINESS REGULATION,
Defendant/Respondents.

CERTIORARI
Docket No.
Court of Appeals No 870567-CA
Priority No. 13

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI OF FINAL DECISION OF THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Capital General Corporation, Appellant herein, by and through
counsel, files this Petition for Writ of Certiorari pursuant to Rules
43 and 46, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
There are three issues presented for review in this matter:
First, were Appellant's gifts of securities without registration with
the Utah Securities Division a violation of Section 61-1-7, Utah Code
Ann., which prohibits sales of securities without registration
(contrary to the plain meaning of the statute which does not include
such a gift, and contrary to a prior ruling by this court that a gift
3

was not a sale within the meaning of the statute)?

The second

question for review is whether there was any basis for the finding
that the gifts of stock made by Appellant were not made in good
faith.

The third issue is whether the Utah Security Advisory Board

acted without legal and statutory authority in it's order of
suspension of trading of Amenity, Inc. stock by basing the suspension
on Section 61-1-14(3), Utah Code Ann. and hence whether the Court of
Appeals erred by holding that reliance by the Respondents on an
inapplicable section of the Utah Code was only harmless error.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Review is sought of a July 3, 1989 decision rendered by the Utah
Court of Appeals. The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review
this matter by a writ of certiorari pursuant to Section 78-2-2(5),
Utah Code Annotated.
CONTROLLING

STATUTES

Section 61-1-7, Utah Code Annotated controls herein:
It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell any security in
this state unless it is registered under this chapter or the
security or transaction is exempted under Section 61-1-14.
Other pertinent statutes include Sections 61-1-13(15), 61-1-14(3),
and 61-1-20, Utah Code Annotated, all of which are too lengthy to
quote here and will be set forth in the appendix.

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a final decision of the Utah Court of
Appeals issued on July 3, 1989 which upheld the Final Order of the
Utah Securities Advisory Board and the Executive Director of the Utah
Department of Business Regulation which suspended all secondary
trading exemptions of the stock of Amenity, Inc.
B. Course of Proceedings
On June 5, 1986, the Utah Securities Division brought an action
before itself pursuant to Section 61-1-14(3) of the Utah Uniform
Securities Act to revoke all trading exemptions of Amenity, Inc. by
authority of Section 61-1-14. (R. 73-74).

The petition alleged, in

substance, that Appellant had made a distribution of Amenity, Inc.
stock in violation of Section 61-1-7, Utah Code Ann., and that such
was done for the purpose of evading the registration requirements of
the Securities Act. (R. 73-74).
The matter was set for an evidentiary hearing before an
administrative law judge who held for the Appellant and denied the
Respondents' petition by finding "there being no proper basis to
conclude that the registration requirements of Section 61-1-7 are
applicable to the disposition of the securities in question." (R.
31).

Respondents sought further review by having a further hearing

held on January 20, 1987 before the Utah Securities Advisory Board.
The Board overruled the determination of the administrative law judge
by ruling that the gifts of stock by Appellant violated Section
61-1-7, Utah Code Ann. The Final Order of Suspension was later
5

issued pursuant to Section 61-1-14(3), Utah Code Ann. (R. 16-20).
Appellant filed a petition in the Third District Court for review
and the District Court summarily upheld the Final Order.
Appeal was thereafter taken to the Utah Court of Appeals, where a
decision was issued by that Court on July 3, 1989.

This petition for

a writ of certiorari is taken from that decision.
C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1. Amenity, Inc. was incorporated on January 7, 1986 with
capitalization of 100,000,000 shares of $0,001 par value. (R. 28).
2. On January 8, 1986, 1,000,000 shares were issued to Appellant
Capital General Corporation for consideration of $2,000.00 cash.

As

of that date, Appellant was the sole shareholder of the company. (R.
28) .
3. Appellant is a financial consulting firm, incorporated in
1971, and has numerous contacts, customers, former customers,
business associates, etc. in the financial world.
4. Appellant gave 100 shares from its 1,000,000 shares of
Amenity, Inc. to each of approximately 900 of such customers,
contacts, etc.

No registration statement for the gifted shares was

filed. (R. 29).
5. No consideration or payment of any kind for the stock was
solicited or accepted.

The 90,000 shares of stock given were given

as free bona fide gifts.

The recipients did not have to buy

anything, become a customer of Appellant, fill out any questionnaire
or pay or provide any consideration at all, and they were free to
reject the gifts if they desired.
6

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEALS
DECIDED A QUESTION OF LAW IN CONFLICT WITH A PRIOR DECISION OF THIS
COURT AND CONSTRUED THE PLAIN WORDS OF THE CONTROLLING STATUTE
CONTRARY TO THEIR USUAL AND CUSTOMARY MEANING
The Court of Appeals held that Appellant's gift of shares of
stock to

900 individuals comes within the requirements of Section

61-1-7, Utah Code Ann.

It determined that these gifts were

equivalent to a "sales", and hence subject to registration.

It

reached this conclusion, apparently, by finding that Appellant
received indirect benefits from the gifts of the stock by the fact
that once the stock had been distributed, Amenity, Inc. in effect
became a public company in which Appellant held most of the stock.
In light of these benefits, the Court equated

Appellant's gift with

"disposition of a security or interest in a security for value,"
which would constitute a sale, as set forth in Section
61-1-13(15)(a), Utah Code Ann.
This interpretation by the Court of Appeals is in direct conflict
with the general proposition that words used in statutes are to be
construed according to their plain meaning and should not be
stretched to accomplish a particular purpose not intended or
specified by the legislature.
Section 68-3-11, Utah Code Ann. provides that
Words and phrases are to be construed according to the context
and approved usage of the language; but technical words and
phrases, and such others as have acquired a peculiar and
appropriate meaning in law, or are defined by statute, are to be
construed according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or
definition.
7

The words "sale" and "sell" are not peculiar or technical words.
Their definition in the statutes involved here are totally consistent
with the plain meaning and approved usage in the english language.
The fact that Section 61-1-13(15)(a) provides that a sale may include
a disposition for "value" does not significantly add anything to that
meaning.
Gord v. Salt Lake City. 434 P.2d 449 (Utah 1967) at 451:
The statute should not be stricken down nor applied other than in
accordance with its literal wording unless it is so unclear or
confused as to be wholly beyond reason, or inoperable, or it
contravenes some basic constitutional right. If it meets these
tests, it is not the court's prerogative to consider its wisdom
or it effectiveness, nor even the reasonableness or orderliness
of the procedures set forth, but it has a duty to let it operate
as the legislature has provided.
Had the Utah Legislature intended the prohibition respecting sales of
securities

in Section 61-1-7 to apply also to all gifts of

securities, it would have been an easy thing for the legislature to
have included gifts as well as sales in the wording of the statute.
But it didn't.
In fact, in Section 61-1-13(15)(c), Utah Code Ann., the
legislature specified a class of gifts that are specifically brought
within the definition of "sale or sell":
(ii) a purported gift of assessable stock is an offer or sale as
is each assessment levied on the stock.
Had the legislature intended to carve out any other exceptions that
would make any other gifts the equivalent of a sale, xt could have
done so, but it hasn't.
The courts may not look beyond the words of the statute, but are
constitutionally bound to ascribe to them their plain meaning.
8

That the Court of Appeals should have done that instead of
interpreting the word "sale" to include the gifts involved in this
matter is obvious not only because of legal precedent, but because of
the reason such precedents have been established.

Simply stated, to

hold otherwise would not be fair or consistent to citizens who rely
on the common accepted usages of the words and phrases in statutes in
conducting their affairs.
The courts have been saying to legislatures and regulatory
agencies for a long time, and should continue to do so, that they are
not going to allow those who enforce legislative enactments to go
beyond the plain meaning of the language.
The reason for this has been well stated by the Utah Supreme
Court in the case of Andrews v. Chase, 49 P.2d 938 (Utah 1935).
Andrews, which was similar to the present case, involved gifts of
stock and a claim that since something was anticipated in return,
that it wasn't a gift but a sale.

The Court stated:

The stock here involved is not one of the kinds of securities
which are exempt from the provisions of the Securities Act.
Appellant does not contend otherwise. What he does contend is
that the Act merely regulates the sale of securities and has no
application whatever to securities which are given away. It
will be observed that "sale or sell" is defined as every
disposition, or attempt to dispose, of a security or interest in
a security for value. The words "for value" are descriptive of,
and constitute a limitation on, the kind of transactions which
the Securities Act was intended to regulate. It is a cardinal
rule of the construction of a statue that, when possible, effect
must be given to all the language used in the Act. If the
legislature had intended the words "sale or sell" should include
"gift or give," it would not have limited the former words to
such disposals, or attempted disposals of securities as are made
for value... Had the lawmaking power intended that the Act
should apply to gifts or securities, it would have been a simple
matter to have so provided.
49 P.2d at 941. (Emphasis added).
9

Appellant respectfully submits that that language of the Utah
Supreme Court has never been overruled, is still valid law and should
remain such, and applies directly to and is controlling in this case.
The Court of Appeals erred in going beyond the meaning of the
plain words of the statue by ascribing "technical expertise" and
"more extensive experience" to the Securities Advisory Board and
therefore giving deference to their interpretation of the statute.
Appellant asserts that none of the cases cited, either in
Respondents' briefs below, or in the Court of Appeals decision, stand
for the proposition that such "extensive experience" or "technical
expertise" of an agency can be used to substitute for the plain
meaning of the words in a statute.

If the decision of the lower

court is allowed to stand, it is a dangerous precedent restricting
the rights of citizens with respect to the interpretations of
statutes in allowing regulatory agencies to place their private
interpretations in place of the common meaning of words.
For this reason, the matter should be fully reviewed by this
Court and decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.

POINT TWO
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEALS
AFFIRMED THE DETERMINATION OF THE RESPONDENT AGENCY THAT THE SUBJECT
GIFTS WERE NOT MADE IN GOOD FAITH DESPITE THERE BEING NO BASIS IN
FACT FOR SUCH A DETERMINATION
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conclusion of the Securities
Advisory Board that the Appellant's distribution of the stock was not
a good faith gift under Section 61-l-13(15)(d)(i), Utah Code Ann. on
10

the basis that the Board's conclusion was reasonable and rational.
Appellant respectfully submits that there is not a scintilla of
evidence in the record of any bad faith on the part of Appellant
which would give the Board a basis for finding a lack of good faith
in the making of the gifts of stock.
The record, rather has ample evidence of good faith on the part
of the Appellant in the action taken in makihg gifts of Amenity, Inc.
stock:
1.

Testimony at the administrative level indicated a bona fide

and good faith intent on the part of Appellant to benefit the various
donees. (R. 118).
2.

Testimony also showed that in furtherance of Appellant's good

faith intent to benefit the giftees of stock, it took further action
with respect to the development of Amenity, Inc. into a viable
business, thus enhancing the value of the gifts. (R. 118).
3.

The testimony was undisputed that Appellant had no intent to

violate Section 7 of the Act which requires registration of sales of
stock and it would have been happy to register the gift shares had it
believed the statute required registering of gifted shares. (R. 118).
The Securities Act does not contain any provision requiring
registration in order to convert a private company into a public
company.

Rather, the Act provides only that one cannot sell stock to

the public without registration.

Accordingly, if distribution of

stock does not come within the meaning of the word sale, then there
is no violation of the Act by the mere gifting to the stock of a
private corporation, as discussed in Point One above.
11

There is no evidence in the record on which to base a finding of
bad faith on the part of the Appellant, or on which to find a lack of
good faith.

This Court should grant the petition for writ of

certiorari and reverse the determination of the Court of Appeals that
the Board's conclusion that Appellant did not qualify for the "good
faith gift" exception of the statute was reasonable and rational

POINT THREE
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE THE LOWER COURT
RENDERED A DECISION WHICH HAS SO FAR SANCTIONED A DEPARTURE FROM THE
USUAL AND ACCEPTABLE COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO CALL FOR
EXERCISE OF THIS COURT'S SUPERVISION BY ALLOWING RESPONDENTS TO ACT
WITHOUT PROPER STATUTORY AUTHORITY BY PROCEEDING UNDER THE WRONG
SECTION OF THE SECURITIES ACT AND ADOPT A REMEDY NOT AUTHORIZED BY
THE ACT
We come now to the third issue, assuming that the gifts in
question violated Section 7 of the Act: Was the remedy used by the
Utah Securities Division in suspending trading of the stock under
Section 61-1-14(3) legally authorized in the statutes?

The answer is

no.
Appellant very emphatically alleges that even if the gifts of
Appellant were in fact sales (whether by reason of the circuitous
reasoning of the lower agency and court which resulted in calling a
gift a sale, or even if, though not a fact in this case, Appellant
received money for the shares from a recipient or purchaser) the
order of suspension below should be set aside as a matter of law for
the reason that there is no statutory authority for this suspension.
The Court of Appeals, although apparently conceding in it's
decision that the Respondents applied the wrong provision of the Utah
12

Uniform Securities Act, dismissed the matter as harmless error.
This, however, is an incorrect application of the law and should be
reversed by this Court.
The question itself of whether the courts should uphold an agency
action based upon the wrong provision of the law is an important
question of state law that should be settled by this Court.
Section 61-1-20, U.C.A., is the proper section under which the
Respondents should have brought action for a violation of Section 611-7, if indeed the section were violated.

It provides for various

actions that may be taken by the Division of Securities to stop or
prevent various violations of the Utah Uniform Securities Act.

These

include the issuance of a cease and desist order after an order to
show cause hearing is held, or the bringing of an action in the
District Court to enforce compliance with the Act.

In a court

action, the court is empowered to issue injunctions and restraining
orders, enter declaratory judgments, order disgorgement, order
rescission, impose fines, and enter any other just relief.
In comparison, Section 61-1-14(3) is limited to issues relating
to Section 14 exemptions that may be denied or revoked by the
Securities Advisory Board and the Executive Director of the
Department of Business Regulations.
The Court of Appeals recognized that this section did not apply
to the action taken by the Respondents in this case, but brushed it
off as harmless error by concluding that the same procedural and
substantive safeguards are afforded by both Section 61-1-14(3) and
61-1-20.

A comparison of the two sections will show that this is not
13

correct.

For example, Section 61-1-20 provides that any enforcement

beyond a cease and desist order that may be issued by the Division of
Securities must be pursued in the District Court.

Such would entitle

the Appellant and others charged with violation of the act to a jury
trial.

This is not available under Section 61-1-14(3).

The "harmless error" position taken by the Court of Appeals is
incorrect even as to the substantive remedy of the two sections in
that Section 61-1-20 is obviously designed to go against the violator
of the Act and prevent further violations of the Act and does not
even mention suspending the stock of a corporation as a possible
remedy.

In comparison, Section 61-1-14(3), where suspension or

revocation of an exemption is the only remedy discussed, is obviously
designed to allow correction of situations where exemptions are being
claimed which should not be - a totally different basis for action
and a totally different type of remedy.

Section 61-1-20 goes against

the violator, whereas Section 61-1-14(3) goes against all stock and
affects all holders of the stock, whether violators or not.
Obviously, the Act was well thought out because if someone sold
stock in violation of Section 61-1-7, the idea would be to punish or
enjoin the perpetrator under Section 61-1-20, not suspend trading
under section 61-1-14(3), which would hurt the purchasers, the very
persons the Act is designed to protect (assuming they have valid
exemptions.
However, it is not necessarily relevant whether Section 61-1-20
provides similar procedural or substantive safeguards or remedies in
comparison with Section 61-1-14(3).

The heart of the matter is that
14

the Respondents used an inapplicable section of the Securities Act
and hence acted without authority in suspending the trading of
Amenity, Inc. stock.
Any assertion that the Respondents may use an inapplicable
section of State law to enforce perceived violations of the
Securities Act is without basis in the law and should be rejected by
this Court.

To allow otherwise would establish a dangerous

precedent.
Accordingly, for this reason, as well as for the reasons set
forth regarding the other issues above, this Court should grant
certiorari and consider the issues presented here.

Respectfully submitted this 1st day of August, 1989.
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David H. Day, Murray, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam, Stephen G. Schwendiman, William B<
McKean, Salt Lake City, for Respondent

Before Judges Bench, Garff, and Or me*
ORME, Judge:
Capital General Corporation ("CGC") appeals the district
court's affirmance of the Utah Securities Advisory Board's
suspension of all secondary trading exemptions of Amenity, Inc.
stock. The Board concluded that CGC had violated the Utah
Uniform Securities Act by distributing 90,000 shares of
Amenity, Inc. stock without registration. We affirm.
THE UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT
The Utah Uniform Securities Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1
to -30 (1986), vests the Utah Securities Division with the
authority to regulate the issuance and subsequent trading of
securities within the state of Utah. One of the Act's primary
purposes is to prevent fraudulent or inequitable securities
transactions. See, e.g., Technomedical Labs, Inc. v. Utah Sec.
Piv.. 744 P.2d 320, 322 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). This task is
accomplished largely by requiring registration with the
division, including the disclosure of information deemed

pertinent to the investing public, before certain securities
transactions may be legally consummated, id. CGC challenges
the division's authority to require registration of the
Amenity, Inc. shares at issue here, which CGC asserts were
merely "given away."
FACTS
On January 7, 1986, Amenity, Inc. was incorporated with
capitalization of 100,000,000 shares, each having a one-tenth
of a cent par value. On January 8, 1986, 1,000,000 shares of
Amenity, Inc. stock were issued to appellant CGC, a financial
consulting firm, for $2000. Shortly thereafter, CGC
distributed a total of 90,000 of those shares to approximately
900 of its clients, business associates, and other contacts.
CGC claims it distributed the Amenity, Inc. shares to create
and maintain goodwill among clients and contacts, and it is
undisputed that CGC did not receive any monetary or other
direct financial consideration from those receiving the stock.
After the distribution, CGC and its distributees held 100%
of Amenity, Inc.'s outstanding stock; CGC held 91%, and the
distributees held the remaining 9%. From all that appears,
Amenity, Inc. had no actual business function at this time and
its sole asset was the $2000 CGC had paid for the 1,000,000
shares. Shortly thereafter, Amenity, Inc. was acquired by
another company. CGC was instrumental in this acquisition and
received $25,000 for its efforts.
On June 5, 1986, the Utah Securities Division filed a
petition seeking the suspension of all possible secondary
trading exemptions for Amenity, Inc. stock.1 The petition
alleged that CGC distributed the 90,000 shares of Amenity, Inc.
stock in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-7 (1986).
An evidentiary hearing was held before an administrative
law judge, who denied the petition and ruled that the Act's
registration requirements did not apply to CGC's distribution
of the Amenity, Inc. stock. The division sought further
administrative review of this matter, and a second evidentiary
hearing was subsequently held before the Utah Securities
Advisory Board. After the hearing, the Board rejected the
1. The primary effect of such an order is to force each party
holding the affected shares to register with the division prior
to any further trading. Absent such an order, holders of
shares may avoid registration and trade their shares freely if
a secondary exemption can be claimed. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 61-1-14 (1986).

870567-CA
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administrative law judge's recommended conclusion that the Act
did not apply, instead concluding that CGC's distribution of
the 90,000 shares was indeed covered by the Act and, without
registration, violated Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-7 (1986).
Accordingly, the Board issued an order of suspension pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-14(3) (1986). CGC filed a petition in
the district court seeking reversal of the Board's order.
Following the district court's affirmance, CGC brought this
appeal.
This case presents three issues of apparent first
impression in Utah: First, whether the division may require
registration under the Act where securities are distributed to
others without cost; second, whether the Board's conclusion
that CGC's distribution was not a "good faith gift" under Utah
Code Ann. § 61-1-13(15)(d)(i) (1986) is reasonable and
rational; and third, whether Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-14(3) (1986)
provides a legal basis for the Board's order of suspension.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
CGC brings this appeal, which technically is from the
district court's affirmance of the Board's order. However, we
essentially disregard the district court's disposition and
"review the administrative decision just as if the appeal had
come directly from the agency*"2 Technomedical Labs, 744
P.2d at 321 n.l. See also Bennion v. Utah State Bd. of Oil,
Gas & Mining. 675 P.2d 1135, 1139 (Utah 1983).
The questions presented here are mixed questions of law
and fact or involve the interpretation of "special law." See,
e.g., Utah Dep't of Admin. Servs. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658
P.2d 601, 610 (Utah 1983); Technomedical Labs, 744 P.2d at
323. Moreover, the relevant concepts and terms, treated in the
next three sections of this opinion, are ones with which the
Board has both "technical expertise" and "more extensive
experience." Administrative Services, 658 P.2d at 610. Thus,
2. We have previously noted our disapproval of this
inefficient, two-tiered approach to judicial review of agency
decisions, where first the district court and then an appellate
court review an agency decision "on the record." See Davis
County v. Clearfield Citv, 756 P.2d 704, 710 n.8 (Utah Ct. App.
1988). The Utah Administrative Procedure Act wisely avoids
this duplicative procedure. I£. See Utah Code Ann
§§ 63-46b-15 to -17 (1988). The Act, however, does not apply
to this or other administrative proceedings commenced before
the effective date of the Act. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-22(2) (1988).
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we review the Board's decision for reasonableness and
rationality. Hurlev v. Board of Review, 767 P.2d 524, 527
(Utah 1988). See Tavlor v. Utah State Training School. 109
Utah Adv. Rep. 36, 38 (Ct. App. 1989) ("The more likely it is
that agency expertise will assist in resolving an issue, the
more deference courts should give to the agency's
resolution."). Furthermore, it is appropriate to broadly
construe the provisions of the Act to effectuate the
legislative intention behind it. See, e.g., Technomedical
Labs, 744 P.2d at 322.
DISPOSITION FOR VALUE
CGC first argues that the division's authority to require
registration of stocks is limited by Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-7
(1986), which provides, with our emphasis, that "[i]t is
unlawful for any person to offer or sell any security in this
state unless it is registered . . . or the security or
transaction is exempted under § 61-1-14." Thus, we must
determine if CGC's disposition of the 90,000 shares was an
"offer or sale" of Amenity, Inc. securities.
We first turn to § 61-1-13(15)(a), which provides that an
"offer or sale" includes the "disposition of . . . a security
for value." CGC essentially argues that the concept "for
value" mandates a direct exchange of economic considerations
between the transferor and transferee in order for the
transaction to qualify as an "offer or sale" under § 61-1-7.
Hence, since CGC received nothing from its transferees, CGC
claims its disposition of the Amenity, Inc. stock was not an
"offer or sale." The Board, however, took a more liberal view
of the phrase "for value" and held § 61-1-7 did in fact apply.
We must determine whether the Board's decision is within the
bounds of reason and rationality.
In Technomedical Labs, 744 P.2d at 324, this court
affirmed the Board's interpretation and application of the term
"benefit" as it appears in § 61-1-13(12), implicitly accepting
the Board's equating "benefit" with "value."
The [division] found no reason to limit
the definition of "benefit" to monetary
benefit . . . . The [division] relied
upon two federal cases in support of that
position. Securities and Exch. Comm'n v.
Datronics Engineers, Inc., 490 F.2d 250
(4th Cir. 1973), cert, denied, 416 U.S.
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937, 94 S. Ct. 1936, 40 L.Ed.2d 287
(1974); Securities and Exchange Comm'n v.
Harwvn Industries Corp., 326 F.Supp. 943
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). In Datronics and Harwyn,
the courts were asked to decide if the
distribution of a subsidiary's
unregistered shares as a dividend to the
parent's shareholders constituted a "sale"
requiring registration under the Federal
Securities Act of 1933 . . . . Whether a
"sale" had occurred depended upon whether
the distribution was "for value." Both
courts held value would be gained by the
creation of a public market. . . . Such
value includes: 1) an enhanced ability to
borrow; 2) an enhanced ability to raise
equity; 3) the availability of a method of
valuing assets; 4) an enhanced liquidity
of assets; and 5) the prestige associated
with publicly held companies. The
[division] concluded the term "value" in
Harwyn and Datronics is substantially
synonymous with "benefit" in the instant
case.

14.
Especially in light of the above, the Board's
determination that CGC's disposition of the Amenity, Inc. stock
was "for value" is reasonable and rational. In this regard, it
was appropriate for the Board to consider both the intended and
unintended consequences of the disposition. The evidence
before the Board clearly establishes that, prior to the
disposition, CGC held $2000 worth of stock in Amenity, Inc., a
privately held company engaged in no apparent business
operations. By "giving away" 90,000 shares (or 9% of its total
holdings), CGC essentially transformed Amenity, Inc. into a
publicly held company, ripe for acquisition, in which it held
most of the stock. As we observed in Technomedical Labs,
"value" can include enhanced abilities to borrow, raise
capital, and other general benefits associated with publicly
held companies, all of which CGC received through the
disposition. We agree these economic benefits render the
disposition "for value" under § 61-1-13(15)(a), even though

those benefits flowed indirectly from the marketplace rather
than directly from the transferees.3
GOOD FAITH GIFT
CGC additionally argues that even if the disposition was
for valueM in some broad sense, still § 61-1-7 was not
violated because the disposition was a -good faith giftw under
§ 61-1-13(15)(d)(i). At all stages of this dispute, including
on appeal, CGC bears the burden to prove its entitlement to the
-good faith gift- exception to the definition of -offer or
sale-- Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-14.5 (1986). See also
Technomedical Labs, 744 P.2d at 323. The Board determined CGC
failed to meet this burden and consequently held the
disposition was not a -good faith gift.- This conclusion was
largely based on the Board's finding that through the
disposition CGC intended to circumvent the Act's registration
requirements.4 The conclusion finds further support in the
fact that CGC's veiled but fairly obvious purpose was to
H

3. CGC cites Andrews v. Chase, 89 Utah 51, 49 P.2d 938 (1935),
as support for the proposition that a -gift- of securities is
not a -sale- for purposes of § 61-1-7. We do not agree with
this assertion for at least two reasons. First, Andrews is of
extremely doubtful precedential value given the subsequent
amendments to Utah's securities laws. For example, the Act now
explicitly provides that a -good faith gift- is not a Hsale,implying that any gift other than one made in good faith is a
-sale.- Even more compelling is that the Andrews holding would
most likely be different if the case arose under the amended
Act, which now provides that Ha purported gift of assessable
stock,- as that distributed in Andrews, is a -sale- and subject
to § 61-1-7. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-13(15)(c)(ii) (1986).
Second, even if Andrews has any remaining precedential value
under the amended Act, the present facts are distinguishable
and would compel a different result. In Andrews, the gift of
stock was made with the mere expectation of future, speculative
benefits in the form of assessments the donees would
voluntarily choose to pay. See Andrews, 49 P.2d at 942. Here,
the disposition of the Amenity, Inc. shares created an
immediate, actual benefit to CGC in that it now owned
substantial shares in a public company which, but for the
disposition, would be a private company.
4. Typically, a private company wishing to -go public" must
comply with one of three registration procedures. See Utah
Code Ann. §§ 61-1-8 to -10 (1986).
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advance its own economic objectives rather than to make a gift
for reasons of simple generosity.
While perhaps CGCfs stated intention to gratuitously
benefit the distributees without circumventing the Act is not
entirely void of candor, it is easy for us to see how the Board
would reject the idea and instead conclude that CGC's actual
purpose in making the distribution included an intent to
convert a private company into a public company without
registration. The effect of this transformation, in addition
to circumventing the Act's registration requirments, was to
greatly enhance the value of the significant block of Amenity,
Inc.'s outstanding stock which CGC continued to hold.
Additional evidence of CGC's economic self-interest and its
lack of gratuitous intentions is shown by the fact that CGC
similarly converted at least thirty other private companies
into public companies using the same method employed here.
Like Amenity, Inc., at least three of these companies were then
acquired by other companies, resulting in substantial profits
for CGC.
We agree that CGC has failed to prove its entitlement to
the "good faith gift" exception, and the Board*s conclusion
that CGC*s disposition was not a -good faith gift" is
reasonable and rational. Accordingly, because the disposition
was "for value," we affirm the Board's conclusion that CGC
violated § 61-1-7 by failing to register its Amenity, Inc.
stock before the distribution.
STATUTORY BASIS FOR THE BOARD'S ORDER
CGC's final contention is that § 61-1-14(3), which
authorizes the Board to deny or suspend certain secondary
trading exemptions, does not authorize the order of suspension
challenged here. CGC argues that since it is not claiming any
secondary trading exemption, there is no basis for the
suspension and the Board erred in issuing the order in reliance
on § 61-1-14(3).
However, even if CGC is technically correct
in its assertion, we would hold it harmless error.
We held above that CGC violated § 61-1-7 in distributing
the Amenity, Inc. shares without registration. The Board has
the power to remedy a violation of § 61-1-7 under § 61-1-20,
which includes the power to issue an order of similar legal
effect to the order involved here. Given the procedural
history of this case, § 61-1-20 does not extend any additional
or different procedural or substantive safeguards from those
actually employed by the Board. Accordingly, we see no
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prejudice to CGC even if the Board issued its order citing a
technically inapplicable provision of the Act.5
We affirm.

Gregp^y K. Orme, Judge

CONCUR:

~_^^w*C
Russe

ch, Judge

Regnal W. Garff, Judge

/J

5. Since CGC is the only party challenging the order on this
appeal, we have no occasion to determine if the order was
properly issued as to the distributees holding the remaining 9%
of Amenity, Inc. stock.
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

:

ORDER

)

In the Matter of the
Registration Statement of
AMENITY, INC.

:
)
s

Civil No. C87-2625
Judge Pat Brian

)

This matter was heard before this Court on September
L7. 1987, at 8:00 a.m.

The Petitioner was represented by David

H. Day while the Respondent was represented by Nicholas E. Hales,
Assistant Attorney General.

Both parties had previously f i l e d

b r i e f s with the Court outlining their p o s i t i o n s .
The Court, after having heard oral argument, reviewed
the briefs on f i l e , and examined the record from the
administrative proceedings, rules as follows:

The Final Order of the Utah Security Advisory Board and
the Executive Director of the Department of Business Regulation
is upheld.

DATED this /$

day of September, 1987.

"Z
Pat B. Brian

2 ^

District Court Judge

*£T8CFUTAH
.
*7YC*SAtTUKE ) «

C00

DEPUTS

Order of February 18, 1987:
Pinal Order of the Department of Business Regulation and the
Securities Advisory Board suspending all secondary trading
exemptions of the securities of Amenity, Inc. pursuant to
514(3) of the Utah Uniform Securities Act*

Utah Securities Division
Department of Business Regulation
Heder M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South
Post Office Box 45 80 2
Salt Lake City, DT 84145
Telephone: (801) 53 0-6600

BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE
REGISTRATION STATEMENT OF
AMENITY, INC.

FINAL ORDER
CASE NO-

SD-86-11

This proceeding was initiated pursuant to a Petition,
dated June 5, 19 86.

A memorandum in support of a suspension or

trading exemptions was filed by the Division on July 15, 1986.
On August 12, 1986, Respondent filed a response to the Division's
memorandum.
2, 1986.

The Division filed a reply memorandum on September

On September 25, 19 86, oral argument was heard before

the Administrative Law Judge, J. Steven Ecklund.

Mr. Ecklund

issued his findings of fact, conclusions ot law and recommended
order on October 28, 1986.
On January 8, 19 87, the Utah Securities Advisory Board
and William E. Dunn, Executive Director of the Department of
Business Regulation, after careful review of Mr. Ecklundrs
recommended order, issued an order adopting certain provisions of

Mr. Ecklundfs findings of fact and conclusions of lawf but
rejecting the recommended order.

The January 8th Order called a

hearing on January 20, 19 87, for the limited purpose or receiving
evidence as to the intent of Capitol General Corporation and its
principals in their distribution of Amenity stock. We
incorporate the January 8th Order herein by reference.
On January 21, at 3:00 p.m. the additional hearing was
held.

The hearing was held before the Utah Securities Advisory

Board with J. Steven Ecklund, Administrative Law Judge,
conducting the hearing.

Respondent Amenity, Inc. was represented

by David Day while Petitioner Utah Securities Division was
represented by Nicholas E. Hales, Assistant Attorney General.
The Utah Securities Advisory Board and William E. Dunn
Executive Director of the Department of Business Regulation,
after careful consideration of all the evidence presented by both
parties at both hearings, and review of the briefs on file,
hereby makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Final Order:

• 2

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Capital General Corporation has incorporated

approximately 30 other companies ("companies") and caused them to
go public by distributing their shares to a wide range of
shareholders in a similar fashion to Amenity*
2.

In June of 1986- Amenitv Inc. was acquired by Elkin

Weiss and Companies Inc
been acquired.

Two additional "companies" have also

They are Olympus Enterprisesf now Florida Growth

Industries, Inc., and Y Travel, now H & B Carriers, Inc.
3.

Capital General Corporation was instrumental in the

acquisition of Amenity, Olympus, and Y Travel by the acquiring
companies.

Capitol General received $25,000.00 for the services

it performed.
4.

The distribution of Amenity stock was done with an

intent to circumvent or frustrate the purposes of the Utah
Uniform Securities Act and the registration provisions contained
therein.

- 3 -

Conclusions of Law
As was concluded in our January 8/ 1987, Order, as a
matter of law, the term "good faith gift" in the context in which
it is usedf i.e., in the Utah Uniform Securities Act, means a
bona fide gift of securities given in "good faith", i.e., not
given with an intent to circumvent or frustrate the purposes of
the Utah Uniform Securities Act and, most relevant to the instant
case, the registration provisions contained therein*

We have

found that the distribution of Amenity stock was done with an
intent to circumvent or frustrate the purposes of the Utah
Uniform Securities Act*

As such, we conclude that the

distribution of the gifted Amenity stock was not done ,in good
faith.
We have previously concluded that .the gift distribution
of Amenity stock was done for consideration, and thus was an
offer or sale of a security as defined by the Utah Uniform
Securities Act.

The distrih«+-inn of the Amenity stock is not

entitled to the good faith exclusion provided by the Act because
it was not done in good faith.

The Respondent has not

demonstrated the existence of any exemption or exception for the
Amenity distribution.
sought or granted.

No registration of the stock has been

We must conclude that the distribution ot

Amenity stock constituted the unregistered offer or sale of a
security in violation of the Act.

- 4 -

ORDER

THEREFORE, pursuant to Section 14(3) of the Utah
Uniform Securities Act, it is hereby ordered that the use of all
secondary trading exemptions of the securities of Amenity, Inc.,
its affiliates and successors, be and are hereby suspended*

DATED this

\'\

&

day of February, 1987,

' < < C

Keith A* Cannon
Chairmanr
Securities Advisory Board

William E* Dunn
Executive Director,
Department of Business Regulation

Jki^uo£ fl'UA,Hfr

MargaFet Wickens
Member'
Securities Advisory Board

s^,K -\ .w~*>^ •>-_.

Kent BUrgen,^;/ r
Member
/ *
Securities Advisory Board

!• Hardy
Member
Securities Advisoky Board
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Final Order to David H. Day, Day and Barney, 45 E. Vine St.,
Murray, Utah 84107.
)
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Order o£ October 28, 1986:
Recommended Order of J. Steven Ecklund, Administrative Law
Judge, dismissing the petition of the Utah Securities
Division seekinq suspension of trading of Amenity, Inc.
stock*

BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND
RECOMMENDED ORDER
CaseNoSD-86-11

In the matter of the Registration Statement
of Amenity Inc.

Appearances:
Nicholas E. Hales for the Division of Securities
David H. Day for Respondent
By the Administrative Law Judge:
The instant proceeding was initiated pursuant to the issuance of a Petition, dated June S. 1986. Thereafter,
counsel for the respective parties agreed to submit the matter on memoranda. On July 15,1986, the division filed a
memorandum in support of a suspension of trading exemptions regarding Respondent's securities. On August 12,
1986, Respondent filed its' responsive memorandum. A reply memorandum was subsemientlv filed on September 2,
1986.
Oral argument was presented on September 25,1986 before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for
the department The Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the premises, now enters the following
findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommended order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Respondent was incorporated on January 7,1986 in the State of Utah with a capitalization of
100,000,000 shares of stock at $0,001 par value per share. Respondent's incorporators and directors arc Julie
Harmon, Cynthia Pasketr, and Jeri Paoersson.
2.

On January 7,1986,1,000,000 shares of stock were issued by Respondent to Capital General

Corporation for S2,000. Capital General Corporation is a financial consulting firm, whose officers and directors are
David R. Yeaman, Ms. Paskett, and Ms. Paoersson. The monies paid for the stock represent Respondent's only
asset.

3.

As of the just-stated transaction, Capital General Corporation was the only shareholder of Respondent.

Thereafter, Capital General Corporation gave 100 shares of the stock it held to each of approximately 900 people.
Those who received the stock consist of various contacts, customers, former customers, and business associates of
Capital General Corporation.
4.

No consideration or payment for the securities thus transferred was solicited or accepted by Capital

General Corporation. Those who received the securities were not required to purchase anything, become a customer
of Capital General Corporation, or provide any consideration for the securities in question. Capital General
Corporation distributed the stock to reward past association and loyalty and to provide exposure of Capital General
Corporation's consulting business to various financial entities as the means of creating or maintaining good will.
5.

Capital General Corporation has previously capitalized three other subsidiaries, caused said subsidiaries

to become public, and thereafter sold them in mergers with other companies. Respondent's promoters intend to do
likewise respecting Respondent.

CONCLUSIONS OFLAW
The division asserts that Capital General Corporation's distribution of the stock represents the sale of a
security within the meaning of Section 61-l-13(15)(a) and that distribution of said securities without registration oi
the same constitutes the violation of Section 61-1-7. auoted below. The division urges that both the initial and
subseouent nuichasers of a nublic offering are entitled to the protection afforded by disclosure mandated through
registration requirements. Thus, the division contends that full compliance respecting both initial registration
requirements and secondary trading laws must exist and all that possible exemptionsfromregistration requirement
to future trading of Respondent's securities should be suspended.
In opposition thereto, Respondent asserts that the distribution of the securities constitutes a good faith gilt.
which is excluded from the definition of a sale of a security by reason of Section 61-l-13(15)(d)(i). Respondent
contends that the creation or maintenance of good will is not sufficient consideration to conclude that value has
passed within the meaning of Secuon 61-M3(15)(a). Respondent further asserts that registrauon requirements am
inapplicable as to the initial distribution of the securities which occurred, inasmuch as the donees of said distnbuuon
invested nothing and, thus, do not fall within the clsss intended to be protected by the disclosure afforded through

registration requirements. Respondent conceeds that any subsequent public trading of the gifted securiues is subject
to applicable secondary trading laws.
Section 61-1-7, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, provides:
It is unlawful far any person to offer or sell any security in this state unless it isregisteredunder
\Sv\s ctep&x QS \fcfcS333SKjj <K tsaasactim&c&Qc^^m^ Secxicia6l-l-l4.
Section 6M-13(l5)(a) defines "sale" or "sell" to include:
. . . every contract for sale of, contract to sell, or disposiuon of, a security or interest in a security
for value.

"Offer" and "offer to sell" are defined in Section 6l-l-13(15)(b) to include:

. . . every attempt or offer to dispose of, or soliciation of an offer to buy, a security or interest m a
security for value.

Section 61-l-13(15)(d)fflfartherprovides that the above-defined terms do not include a "good faith gift".
Clearly, the previously-described transaction by Capital General Corporationrepresenteda disposition of a
security for value within the meaning of Section 61-l-13(15Xa) or (b). Despite Respondent's assertion that there is
insufficient consideration present to find that value passed to Capital General Corporationfromthe donees of the
securities in question, the creation and/or maintenance of good will and the resulting beneficial exposure of Capital
General Corporation's business in various areasrepresentsthe value envisoned by the just-cited statutes. See
Blackburn vs. Ippofito J l a . . 156 So. 2d 550 (1963); King St al. v§, Southwestern Cotton Oil Co,, Okla. App., 585
?2d 385 (1978).
Thus, the only remaining question is whether the disposition of the securities constituted a good faith gift
exempted from compliance with the registrationrequirementsset forth in Section 61-1-7 byreasonof the
applicability of Section 61-l-13(15)(d)(i). TTie division asserts that the transfer of the securiues from Capital General
Corporation to the donees constitutes a subterfuge designed to avoidregistrationrequirementsmandated by statute
and/or rule, the implication being that the transfer was not one made in "good faith". Concededly, the transfer of the
securities was made to a significant number of entities and the term "good faith gift" is not defined by statute.
However, it has been Stated that "there is no warrant for superimposing a quantity limit on private offerings as a
matter of statutory interpretation." S.E.C. vs. Rawlstnn Pyri\\n ffr, 346 U.S.119,127 ( 1953). Further, there is no

evidence that the disposition of the securities by Capital General Corporation was conditioned upon either action or
inaction of the donees of said securities and the mere fact that value passes upon disposition of a security is not such
as to necessarily conclude that a good faith gift has not been made.
A more consideredreviewrevealsthat therecipientsof the securities were mere donees, to whom the
protection afforded by compliance with registrationrequirementsrespectingfinancialdisclosure as to the securities or
the issuer of the same is not relevant Clearly, securities laws are remedial in nature and should be broadly and
liberally construed to give effect to the legislative purpose. Payable Accounting Corp. vs. McKinlev. Utah. 667
P.2d 15C1983V Nevertheless, under the facts and circumstances presented, Respondent correctly asserts that the
purpose generally served by compliance with registration requirements (i.e., protection of the investing public) has
no applicability as to the donees of the securities in the instant case.

RECOMMENDED ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the relief sought in the Petition, dated June 5,1986, be denied and
said Petition be dismissed, there being no Droner basis to conclude thatregistrationrequirementsmandated by
Section 61-1-7 are applicable to the disposition of the securities in question.
Dated this _

_ day of October ,1986.

61-1-13

SECURITIES DIVISION—REAL ESTATE DIVISION

(c) With respect to (i) interests in trusts, including but not limited
to collateral trust certificates, voting trust certificates and certificates of deposit for securities, or (ii) shares in an investment company
without a board of directors, "issuer" means the person or persons
performing the acts and assuming duties of a depositor or manager
under the provisions of the trust or other agreement or instrument
under which the security is issued.
(d) With respect to an equipment trust certificate, a conditional
sales contract, or similar securities serving the same purpose, "issuer" means the person by whom the equipment or property is to be
used.
(e) With respect to interests in partnerships, general or limited,
"issuer" means the partnership itself and not the general partner or
partners.
(f) With respect to certificates of interest or participation in oil,
gas, or mining titles or leases or in payment out of production under
the titles or leases, "issuer" means the owner of the title or lease or
right of production, whether whole or fractional, who creates
fractional interests therein for the purpose of sale.
(12) "Nonissuer" means not directly or indirectly for the benefit of the
issuer.
(13) "Person" means an individual, a corporation, a partnership, an
association, a joint-stock company, a joint venture, a trust where the
interests of the beneficiaries are evidenced by a security, an unincorporated organization, a government, or a political subdivision of a government.
(14) "Promoter" means any person who, acting alone or in concert with
one or more persons, takes initiative in founding or organizing the business or enterprise of a person.
(15) (a) "Sale" or "sell" includes every contract for sale of, contract to
sell, or disposition of, a security or interest in a security for value.
(b) "Offer" or "offer to selFincludes every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a
security for value.
(c) The following are examples of the definitions in Subsections (a)
and (b):
(i) any security given or delivered with or as a bonus on account of any purchase of a security or any other thing, is part of
the subject of the purchase, and has been offered and sold for
value.
(ii) a purported gift of assessable stock is an offer or sale as is
each assessment levied on the stock.
(iii) an offer or sale of a security that is convertible into, or
entitles its holder to acquire or subscribe to another security of
the same or another issuer is an offer or sale of that security, and
also an offer of the other security, whether the right to convert or
acquire is exercisable immediately or in the future.
(iv) any conversion or exchange of one security for another
shall constitute an offer or sale of the security received in a
conversion or exchange, and the offer to buy or the purchase of
the security converted or exchanged.
24
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(v) securities distributed as a dividend wherein the person receiving the dividend surrenders the right, or the alternative
right, to receive a cash or property dividend is an offer or sale.
(vi) a dividend of a security of another issuer is an offer or
sale.
(vii) the issuance of a security under a merger, consolidation,
reorganization, recapitalization, reclassification, or acquisition
of assets shall constitute the offer or sale of the security issued as
well as the offer to buy or the purchase of any security surrendered in connection therewith, unless the sole purpose of the
transaction is to change the issuer's domicile.
(d) The terms defined in Subsections (a) and (b) do not include:
(i) a good faith gift;
(ii) a transfer by death;
(iii) a transfer by termination of a trust or of a beneficial interest in a trust;
(iv) a security dividend not within clauses [clause] (c)(v) or
(vi);
(v) a securities split or reverse split; or
(vi) any act incident to a judicially approved reorganization in
which a security is issued in exchange for one or more outstanding securities, claims, or property interests, or partly in such
exchange and partly for cash.
(16) "Securities Act of 1933," "Securities Exchange Act of 1934," "Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935," and "Investment Company Act
of 1940" mean the federal statutes of those names as amended before or
after the effective date of this chapter.
(17) "Security" means any note; stock; treasury stock; bond; debenture;
evidence of indebtedness; certificate of interest or participation in any
profit-sharing agreement; collateral-trust certificate; preorganization certificate or subscription; transferable share; investment contract; burial
certificate or burial contract; voting-trust certificate; certificate of deposit
for a security; certificate of interest of participation in an oil, gas, or
mining title or lease or in payments out of production under such a title or
lease; or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a
"security," or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or
interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing. "Security" does not include
any insurance or endowment policy or annuity contract under which an
insurance company promises to pay money in a lump sum or periodically
for life or some other specified period.
(18) "State" means any state, territory, or possession of the United
States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.
iistory: C. 1953, 61-1-13, enacted by L.
S3, ch. 145, § 1; L. 1983, ch. 284, § 16.
Imendment Notes. — The 1983 amendnt rewrote this section to the extent that a
ailed comparison is impracticable.
nvestment Company Act of 1940. — The

federal Investment Company Act of 1940, referred to in Subsections (3), (10), and (16), appears as 15 U.S.C. § 80a et seq.
Securities Act of 1933. — The federal Secunties Act of 1933, referred to in Subsection
(16), appears as 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq.
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(iii) (A) one person involved in the transaction is required to file
proxy or informational materials under Section 14(a) or (c) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or Section 20 of the Investment
Company Act of 1940 and has so filed; (B) one person involved in the
transaction is an insurance company which is exempt from filing
under Section 12(g)(2)(G) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
has filed proxy or informational materials with the appropriate regulatory agency or official of its domiciliary state; or (C) all persons
involved in the transaction are exempt from filing under Section
12(g)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and file with the
division such proxy or informational material as the division requires
by rule;
(iv) the proxy or informational material is filed with the division
and distributed to all securities holders entitled to vote in the transaction or series of transactions at least ten business days prior to any
necessary vote by the securities holders or action on amy necessary
consent or resolution; and
(v) the division does not, by order, deny or revoke the exemption
within ten business days after filing of the proxy or informational
materials;
(q) any transaction as to which the division, by rule or order, finds that
registration is not necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors.
(3) Upon approval by the executive director and a majority of the Securities
Advisory Board, the executive director may by order deny or revoke any
exemption specified in Subsection (l)(h) or (l)(j) or in Subsection (2) with
respect to: (a) a specific security, transaction, or series of transactions; or (b)
any person or issuer, any affiliate or successor to a person or issuer, or any
entity subsequently organized by or on behalf of a person or issuer generally.
No such order may be entered without appropriate prior notice to all interested parties, opportunity for hearing, and written findings of fact and conclusions of law, except that the division may by order summarily deny or revoke
any of the specified exemptions pending final determination of any proceeding
under this subsection. Upon the entry of a summary order, the division shall
promptly notify all interested parties that it has been entered and of the
reasons therefor and that within 15 business days of the receipt of a written
request the matter will be set down for hearing. If no hearing is requested and
none is ordered by the executive director or division, the order will remain in
effect until it is modified or vacated by the executive director. If a hearing is
requested or ordered, upon approval by the executive director and a majority
of the Securities Advisory Board the executive director, after notice of and
opportunity for hearing to all interested persons, may affirm, modify, or vacate the order or extend it until final determination. The executive director
may not extend any summary order for more than ten business days. No order
under this subsection may operate retroactively. No person may be considered
to have violated § 61-1-7 or 61-1-15 by reason of any offer or sale effected after
the entry of an order under this subsection if he sustains the burden of proof
that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known, of the order.
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61-1-20. Enforcement action authorized — Bond not required.
Whenever it appears to the division that any person has engaged, is engaging, or is about to engage in any act or practice constituting a violation of this
chapter or any rule or order under this chapter, it may take the following
action:
(1) (a) issue an order directing the person to appear before the division
and show cause why an order should not be issued directing the
person to cease and desist from engaging in the act or practice, or
doing any act in furtherance of the activity;
(b) the order to show cause shall state the reasons for the order and
the date of the hearing;
(c) the division shall promptly serve a copy of the order to show
cause upon each person named in the order; and
(d) the division shall hold a hearing on the order to show cause no
sooner than ten business days after the order is issued. After a hearing, the division may issue an order to cease and desist from engaging in any act or practice constituting a violation of this chapter or
any rule or order under this chapter. The order shall be accompanied
by written findings of fact and conclusions of law. If any person
named in the order to show cause fails to appear at the hearing, then
an order to cease and desist may be issued against that person.
(2) bring an action in the appropriate district court of this state or the
appropriate court of another state to enjoin the acts or practices and to
enforce compliance with this chapter or any rule or order under this
chapter. Upon a proper showing the court may:
(a) issue a permanent or temporary, prohibitory or mandatory injunction;
(b) issue a restraining order or writ of mandamus;
(c) enter a declaratory judgment;
(d) appoint a receiver or conservator for the defendant or the defen
dant's assets;
(e) order disgorgement;
(f) order rescission;
(g) impose a fine of not more than $500 for each violation ot uu
act; and
(h) enter any other relief the court considers just. The court ma:
not require the division to post a bond.
History: C. 1953, 61-1-20, enacted by L.
1963, ch. 145, § 1; L. 1983, ch. 284, § 29;
1986, ch. 107, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendment added Subsections (l)(a) through (l)(d);
redesignated part of the former introductory
language as present Subsection (2); redesig-

nated former Subsections (1) through W
present Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(f)faH<te
Subsection (2)(g); redesignated former Subeec
tion (7) and the final sentence as present SuS
section (2)(h); and made minor styiisti
changes,
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